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This study aimed to clarify the neural substrates of behavioral switch and restart costs in intermittently instructed task-switching paradigms. 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded while participants were intermittently cued to switch or repeat their categorization rule 
(Switch task), or else they performed two perceptually identical control conditions (NoGo and Oddball). The three tasks involved different 
task-sets with distinct stimulus-response associations in each, but identical visual stimulation, consisting of frequent colored shapes 
(p = 0.9) and randomly interspersed infrequent black shapes (p = 0.1; ‘+’ and ‘x’ symbols). Behavioral restart costs were observed in 
the ﬁ  rst target responses following all black shapes in the Switch and NoGo tasks – but not in the Oddball task – and corresponded 
with enhanced fronto-centrally distributed early cue-locked P3 activity (peak latency 325–375 ms post-cue onset at the vertex). In turn, 
behavioral switch costs were associated with larger late cue-locked P3 amplitudes in the Switch task only (peak latency 400–450 ms 
post-cue onset at mid-parietal sites). Together with our information theoretical estimations, ERP results suggested that restart and switch 
costs indexed two neural mechanisms related to the preparatory resolution of uncertainty: (1) the intermittent re-activation of task-set 
information, and (2) the updating of stimulus-response mappings within an active task set, as indexed by early and late cue-locked P3 
activations, respectively. In contrast, target-locked P3 activations reﬂ  ected a functionally distinct mechanism related to the implementation 
of task-set information. We conclude that task-switching costs consist of both switch-speciﬁ  c and switch-unspeciﬁ  c processes during 
the preparation and execution stages of task performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans schedule many daily activities in synchrony with environmental 
cues. Neuroscientists have recently adopted task-cueing paradigms for 
exploring the neural dynamics subserving the goal-directed control of 
human cognition (Barcelo, 2003; Braver et al., 2003; Rushworth et al., 
2002), as purportedly different from stimulus-driven control (Näätänen, 
1990; Posner and Petersen, 1990). Task-switching involves alternating 
among 2 or more simple tasks following instruction cues associated with 
pre-learned sets of action rules or task-sets. In a broad sense, a task 
set consists of ‘if…then’ rules governing the mapping between sen-
sory inputs and motor outputs for achieving certain goals (Rubinstein 
et al., 2001; Schneider and Logan, 2006). At the neural level of descrip-
tion, task-set switching demands online maintenance and updating of 
  sensorimotor associations between stated sets of sensory and motor 
representations that are to be intermittently updated – either upheld, 
reversed, or replaced altogether – in a context-sensitive way. Usually 
subjects respond slower and less accurately when switching than when 
repeating a task, a phenomenon known as behavioral switch costs 
(Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 2003).
Most authors now acknowledge a multiplicity of sources for behav-
ioral switch costs. There has been controversy, however, in deﬁ  ning the 
antecedent conditions and relative contribution from endogenous and 
switch-speciﬁ   c mechanisms (e.g., endogenous reconﬁ   guration of task 
set information; cf. Monsell, 2003; Rubinstein et al., 2001), as opposed 
to exogenous and switch-unspeciﬁ  c mechanisms (e.g., sensory priming 
and task-set inertia; cf. Allport and Wylie, 2000; Logan and Bundesen, 
2003; Schneider and Logan, 2005) to the overall behavioral costs. For 
instance, switch-unspeciﬁ  c restart costs (also referred to as the ‘ﬁ  rst-
trial effect’; Allport and Wylie, 2000; Altmann, 2002) are observed when a 
sequence of trials is unpredictably interrupted with an instructional cue. In 
such conditions, substantial restart costs to the ﬁ  rst target trial following 
the interrupting signal are typically observed regardless of whether the 
cue prompts for a switch or a repetition of the previous task. The observa-
tion of larger restart costs following task-switches compared to task-rep-
etitions has also been taken as proof of genuine and speciﬁ  c switch costs 
(Monsell, 2003; Rushworth et al., 2002). Alternatively, these effects have 
been attributed to a common and switch-unspeciﬁ  c ‘strengthening’ of cue-
related sensory memories that would be differentially recruited in switch 
and repeat trials (Altmann, 2002). This type of rationale contends against 
*Correspondence: Francisco Barceló, Department of Psychology, Universitat de les 
Illes Balears; Institut Universitari d’Investigació en Ciències de la Salut (IUNICS), Ctra. 
Valldemossa km 7.5, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain.  e-mail: f.barcelo@uib.es
Abbreviations: EEG, electroencephalography; ERPs, event-related potentials; SD, standard 
deviation; SEM, Standard error of the mean; SOA, stimulus onset asynchrony; S–R, 
stimulus–response; RT, reaction time.
Received: 15 October 2007; paper pending published: 29 November 2007; accepted: 
03 January 2008; published online: 28 March 2008.
Citation: Front. Hum. Neurosci. (2008) 1: 13. doi: 10.3389/neuro.09.013.2007
Copyright © 2008 Barceló, Periáñez and Nyhus. This is an open-access article subject 
to an exclusive license agreement between the authors and the Frontiers Research 
Foundation, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original authors and source are credited.Barceló et al.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  |  March 2008  |  Volume 1  |  Article 13
2
the existence of a dedicated mechanism of endogenous control to account 
for behavioral switch costs (Logan and Bundesen, 2003; Logan et al., 2007; 
Schneider and Logan, 2005). In sum, there is   controversy as to whether 
behavioral switch costs owe to unspeciﬁ  c or speciﬁ  c control operations, 
and to what extent these reﬂ  ect one or several distinct mechanisms, both 
at the neural and cognitive  levels of explanation.
More recent task-switching and sequence-learning studies support 
distinct sources of behavioral costs, owing to distinct levels in a puta-
tive hierarchy of control. For instance, Lien and Ruthruff (2004) inferred 
such hierarchical control from the observation that switching between 
2 blocks of trials within the same task resulted in larger behavioral costs 
than switching between 2 different tasks, even though the transition from 
the ﬁ  rst to the second block of trials involved a task repetition (i.e., XY–YX; 
where X and Y denote trials from 2 different tasks and the hyphen denotes 
a temporal gap between trials). The slowing in motor responses observed 
during the initiation of a sequence of actions is reminiscent of the restart 
costs observed in intermittently-instructed task-cueing paradigms (Lien 
and Ruthruff, 2004). These analogies led Schneider and Logan (2006) to 
consider 2 different levels in a hierarchy of cognitive control, namely (1) the 
control for initiating an action plan (i.e., a sequence of motor actions); and 
(2) the control for switching between individual tasks.
A hierarchical architecture of control has been proposed also at the 
neural level of explanation. Functional brain imaging studies have revealed 
neural activations during block transitions, as well as when starting and 
interrupting sequences of trials, that have been explained as endogenous 
control implemented by lateral prefrontal cortex and/or interconnected brain 
structures (Fox et al., 2005; Konishi et al., 2001). Koechlin and  collaborators 
(2003) proposed a functional hierarchy of control implemented within the 
lateral prefrontal cortex. These authors deﬁ  ned 3 levels of control – senso-
rimotor, contextual, and episodic control – involving a hierarchy of interven-
ing sensorimotor representations linking sensory signals with motor actions 
(see Koechlin and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007, for a review). Koechlin and collabo-
rators capitalized on the concept of mutual information between stimuli 
and responses (or ‘input–output covariances’), as had been used in the past 
for deﬁ  ning the limits of the human capacity for processing information 
(Miller, 1956). One premise of this approach is that the information tradeoff 
between sensory and motor representations along a putative hierarchy of 
cognitive control may be formally estimated using the analytical tools of 
information theory (Koechlin and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007; Miller, 1956).
The fast dynamics of sensory-motor interactions during task-  switching 
can be examined with the excellent temporal resolution of event-related 
potentials (ERPs). A rapidly growing body of evidence lends support to the 
relationship between task-set switching operations and several cognitive 
ERPs characterized by their long-latency and positive polarity (e.g., the 
‘P3’ or ‘P300’ potential; Barcelo, 2003; Barcelo et al., 2006; Karayanidis 
et al., 2003; Kieffaber and Hetrick, 2005; Kopp et al., 2006; Nicholson et al., 
2005; Rushworth et al., 2002). Using a task-  cueing paradigm inspired by 
the Wisconsin card sorting test, Barcelo and collaborators (2002) found that 
task switch cues elicited robust fronto-parietally distributed ‘task- novelty P3’ 
activity whose amplitude, latency, and scalp topography resembled classic 
‘novelty P3’ responses to novel distracters (cf. Friedman et al., 2001). The 
early, frontal aspect of this cue-locked P3 complex (peak latency 385 ms 
at Fz) seemed to work in concert with its late, parietally distributed aspect 
(peak latency 575 ms at Pz) during the updating of task set information in 
preparation for the next target response (Barcelo et al., 2002, 2006). Here 
these 2 aspects of cue-locked P3 activity will be labeled considering their 
peak latencies (‘early’ vs. ‘late’) rather than their scalp distribution (‘frontal’ 
vs.  ‘posterior’) (cf. Friedman et al., 2001). Importantly, these cue-locked P3 
activations were inversely associated with behavioral efﬁ  ciency, with larger 
switch cue-locked P3 activations accompanying larger behavioral costs. 
In contrast, the 1st target following a task-switch elicited reduced target-
locked P3 amplitudes that increased gradually thereafter accompanying 
gradual improvements in card sorting efﬁ  ciency along several repetition 
trials (Barcelo et al., 2000, 2002). These observations suggested that cue-
locked P3 – but not target P3 – potentials indexed transient activation of a 
fronto-posterior network involved in the preparatory resolution of response 
uncertainty (cf. Sutton et al., 1965), since cue-locked P3 amplitudes were 
a function of the amount of task-set information being updated in   working 
memory (Barcelo et al., 2002, 2006). However, these studies could not 
decide whether cue-locked P3 activations – and the accompanying behav-
ioral costs – indexed switch-speciﬁ  c reconﬁ  guration of appropriate S–R 
mappings (Rushworth et al., 2002), perhaps related to the stopping and 
shifting of task-sets (Robbins, 2007), or to a more general switch-unspe-
ciﬁ  c arousal mechanism related to response preparation (Jennings and van 
der Molen, 2005; Kahneman, 1973), or to the improbable onset of task cues 
(Donchin, 1981).
The present study aimed to clarify the nature of restart and switch 
costs in task-switching paradigms (as distinct from other residual 
 ‘mixing  costs’;  Monsell, 2003), and to explore their putative associa-
tion with concurrent cognitive brain potentials as suggested by recent 
ERP ﬁ  ndings (Barcelo et al., 2002, 2006; Rushworth et al., 2002). In so 
doing, we formally estimated the mutual information between stimuli 
and responses to interpret behavioral costs and the accompanying P300 
activations, as these had been intuitively associated with uncertainty 
resolution in the past (Sutton et al., 1965, 1967). From an information 
theoretical perspective, contextually informative signals in task-cueing 
paradigms can be assumed to convey information (and demand cogni-
tive control) at least at 2 hierarchically distinct levels of representation, as 
indexed by restart and switch costs, respectively: (1) lower-order control 
for dealing with unpredictable task-set information in working memory, 
as when initiating a new sequence of trials; and (2) higher-order con-
trol for updating stimulus-response (S–R) mappings within a currently 
active task-set. The ﬁ  rst type of control relates to the resolution of uncer-
tainty generated by the infrequent onset of any cueing signals initiating/
interrupting a new/old action plan (i.e., both ‘switch’ and ‘repeat’ cues; see 
Figure 1). The second type of control relates to the resolution of uncer-
tainty speciﬁ  cally associated with ‘switch’ cues for updating appropriate 
Figure  1. Experimental design and task-set information.  (A) Stimulus 
material. All 3 tasks consisted of the same sequence of frequent colored 
shapes (p =  0.9) with semi-randomly interspersed infrequent black sym-
bols (p = 0.05 for both ‘+’ and ‘x’ symbols). In the Switch task, symbols ‘x’ 
and ‘+’ instructed subjects to switch and repeat the previous S–R mapping, 
respectively. The NoGo task consisted of two-forced response choices (i.e., 
‘press button 1 for circles and button 2 for squares’), whereas the Oddball task 
involved one-forced response trials (i.e., ‘press button 1 for squares’). Subjects 
were explicitly instructed not to respond to the black symbols ‘x’ and ‘+’ in the 
NoGo and Oddball tasks. (B) Hypothetical task-set information and S–R map-
pings. Task demands were manipulated (1) by varying the amount of task-set 
information to be handled in working memory (Oddball vs. NoGo tasks); and 
(2) by varying the contextual meaning of black symbols for updating the active 
S–R mappings (NoGo vs. Switch tasks; see Tables 1 and 2).Task switching and information theory
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S–R mappings in working memory (Barcelo et al., 2006; Koechlin et al., 
2003). We employed an intermittently-instructed task-cueing paradigm 
(Switch task) and 2 perceptually identical control tasks (NoGo and Oddball) 
to examine behavior and brain activations under 3 identical stimulus con-
texts, while manipulating response demands at 2 different levels within the 
putative hierarchy of cognitive control (Barcelo and Knight, 2007; Koechlin 
and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007). This design allowed us to dissociate the lower-
level re-activation of infrequent task-set information from the higher-level 
updating of appropriate S–R associations. In so doing, the NoGo task com-
prised an equivalent amount of task-set information as the Switch task, 
but no explicit demands for updating the active S–R mappings. In turn, the 
Oddball task consisted of similar sensory information as the other 2 tasks, 
but with lesser response demands (see Figure 1).
First, we hypothesized that if restart costs reﬂ  ect the intermittent 
updating of task-set information in preparation for the next trial sequence, 
then similar restart costs should be observed in NoGo and Switch tasks, 
given their equivalent amounts of task-set information (with 6:3 S–R 
mappings each; see Figures 1 and 2). Conversely, less control and com-
paratively smaller restart costs would be expected for the Oddball task 
with a lesser amount of task-set information (with 6:2 S–R mappings; see 
Figures 1 and 2 and the “Appendix” section for our estimations of mutual 
information, stimulus and response entropy). Second, we predicted spe-
ciﬁ  c switch costs following switch cues in the Switch task only. Likewise, 
we predicted that restart and switch costs would correlate with enhance-
ments of early and late cue-locked P3 activations, respectively, as these 
have been linked to the preparatory resolution of response uncertainty 
in previous ERP studies (Barcelo et al., 2002; Rushworth et al., 2002). 
In contrast, response uncertainty was expected to reduce target-locked 
P3 amplitudes during the implementation of task-set information (task 
execution). Alternatively, if behavioral switch and restart costs and the 
accompanying P3 activations were primarily determined by sensory 
encoding and/or sensory priming mechanisms (Altmann, 2002; Logan 
and Bundesen, 2003), or by purely sensory   factors such as the stimulus 
context (Polich, 2007; Sutton et al., 1967), then we would expect equiva-
lent behavioral costs and transient P3 activations across all perceptually 
similar tasks.
These predictions were made based on the auditory brain responses 
to tonal switch and repeat cues from our previous task-cueing studies. 
Here we extended predictions to the visual modality on the assumption 
that cognitive P300 potentials index updating of sensorimotor represen-
tations in widely distributed multimodal cortical-subcortical networks 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Ranganath and Rainier, 2003; Soltani and 
Knight, 2000; Sutton et al., 1965). Our information theoretical approach 
allowed us to address the same task-switching processes employing 
simpler task procedures and stimulus materials than those in our previ-
ous studies (Barcelo et al., 2000, 2002, 2006). This facilitated the esti-
mation of mutual information between stimuli and responses across our 
different task conditions (Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 1 and 2).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Fifty undergraduate students (32 females, 18 males; mean  ± SD  age: 
20.7 ±  3.1  years) with more than 10  years of education (mean  ± SD: 
13.6 ± 2.5 years of education) took part in the study. They all had normal or 
corrected to normal visual acuity and no history of neurological or psychi-
atric disorders. Subjects were informed about the purpose of the investiga-
tion before the experimental session and signed a consent form according 
to the Declaration of Helsinki. Experimental procedures were in accordance 
with the Bioethics Committee of the University of the Balearic Islands.
Behavioral procedures
Participants sat in a comfortable chair in a dimly lit and electrically 
shielded chamber facing a computer monitor at a distance of 1 minute. 
Stimuli consisted of 4 equiprobable colored shapes (e.g., red and blue 
colored circles and squares; p = 0.225 each) and 2 infrequent black 
shapes (e.g.,  ‘+’ and ‘x’ symbols; p =  0.05 each; see Figure 1A). 
All stimuli had the same spatial dimensions with 6.5  × 6.5 cm,  or 
3.8º × 3.8º of visual angle. Stimulus duration was 150 ms and stimu-
lus onset asynchrony (SOA) varied   randomly between 1500–1560 ms 
(Figure 1). A single block of trials was constructed and employed in 
the 3 task conditions. A trial sequence was deﬁ  ned as those colored 
shapes presented between 2 consecutive black symbols in any of the 
3 task conditions. Task stimuli were delivered semi-randomly with the 
constraint that trial sequences consisted of a varying number of 4 to 
8 colored shapes presented between 2 consecutive black symbols. The 
speed and accuracy of responses were both emphasized in the 3 task 
conditions. Before the experimental session, subjects performed 1 prac-
tice session of 390 trials to ensure they had understood the instructions 
and reached an asymptote in their learning curve. In the experimen-
tal session each subject performed a total of 780 trials distributed in 
2 runs of approximately 12 minutes duration each. Upon arrival to the 
laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to 1 of the 3 task condi-
tions (Switch, NoGo, Oddball). Therefore, all subjects received the same 
sequence of visual stimuli, but only 1 of the 3 sets of task instructions. 
A group design was preferred to a within-subject design in order to 
avoid any carry-over effects between task conditions (i.e., due to over-
learning, to interference between successive task-sets, habituation of 
transient P3 responses, etc.).
The Switch task consisted of a variant of the intermittent-instruction 
paradigm (Monsell, 2003; Rushworth et al., 2002). Seventeen subjects 
were instructed to sort colored-shapes according to 2 classiﬁ   cation 
rules, either color or shape, by pressing the left and right buttons of 
a response panel with their left and right index ﬁ  ngers, respectively. 
When sorting by the color rule, subjects pressed the left button for ‘red’ 
Figure 2.  A priori estimations of transmitted information between stim-
uli and responses as a function of the sensory entropy of black symbols 
(0.22 bits) and colored-shaped stimuli (0.48 bits) in the 3 task condi-
tions (after Miller, 1956). Visual targets conveyed the same information for 
response selection in all 3 task conditions. In turn, black symbols conveyed 
varying amounts of information for response selection in the Oddball, NoGo 
and Switch tasks. In the Switch task, ‘x’ switch cues conveyed 1 more bit of 
information than ‘+’ repeat cues for updating the active S–R mapping (see 
Tables 1 and 2 and the “Appendix” section; cf. Koechlin et al., 2003).Barceló et al.
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and the right button for ‘blue’. When sorting by the shape rule,   subjects 
pressed the left button for ‘circle’ and the right button for ‘square’. The 
black symbols ‘+’ or ‘x’ instructed subjects to either ‘repeat’ or ‘switch’ 
the previous rule, respectively. These simple S–R mappings sufﬁ  ced 
for an accurate scoring of behavioral responses within a series of rep-
etition trials, but could result in inaccurate scoring of task-switching 
errors at rule transition points (i.e., after a black symbol; Barcelo et al., 
2000). In order to avoid this, the ﬁ  rst and last shapes in a trial sequence 
always consisted of either a red square or a blue circle. In order to keep 
perceptual priming effects constant, we controlled for the sequential 
probabilities between every pair of stimuli. The overall probability of 
2 successive switch cues (× ×…× ×…) was the same as that of 2 suc-
cessive repeat cues (+ +…+ +…). Likewise, the probability of alternations 
between switch-repeat cues (× ×…+ +…) was the same as the probability 
of repeat-switch alternations (+ +…× ×…). Finally, black symbols ‘x’ and 
‘+’ instructed the same number of switches and repetitions to the color 
and shape rules, respectively.
The NoGo task served as a control for the Switch task, presenting 
similar stimulus and response demands but without the need to recon-
ﬁ  gure the stimulus-response mappings (see Figures 1 and 2, Tables 
1 and 2, and the “Appendix” section). Sixteen subjects were instructed 
to sort the same sequence of colored-shapes according to either the 
color rule or the shape rule in each of 2 experimental runs (e.g., using 
the color rule in the ﬁ  rst run and then the shape rule in the second run, 
or vice versa). The S–R mappings for the color and shape rules were 
the same as in the Switch condition (Figure 1B). Additionally, subjects 
were told to withhold their response to the black symbols. The order of 
administration of the color and shape runs was counterbalanced across 
subjects.
The Oddball task was intended to provide a control with an equivalent 
stimulus context and identical perceptual demands as the Switch and 
NoGo conditions, but with lesser response demands (see Figures 1 and 2, 
Tables 1 and 2, and the “Appendix” section for estimations of the infor-
mation   content of black symbols in each task). Seventeen participants 
were asked to press a button with their right index ﬁ  nger to any ‘square’ 
stimulus in 1 experimental run, and to any ‘blue’ stimulus in another run. 
They were also asked to withhold their responses to any other non-  target 
stimulus. The order of administration of the 2 experimental runs was 
counterbalanced across subjects.
The stimulus material in our tasks was chosen to keep working 
memory demands and novelty effects to a minimum. In particular, the 
6 perceptual items employed in our 3 tasks could be easily memorized 
and discriminated from each other, and they were selected to meet with 
the theoretical limits of the human capacity for selecting and holding 
information in working memory (Miller, 1956).
ERP recordings
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 28 tin electrodes 
positioned at Fp1, Fp2, Fz, F3, F4, F7, F8, FCz, FC3, FC4, Cz, C3, C4, 
CP3, CP4, Pz, P3, P4, TP7, TP8, FT7, FT8, T3, T4, T5, T6, O1, and O2, 
and referenced to the left mastoid. The EEG signal was ampliﬁ  ed (band 
pass, 0.01–30 Hz; 12 dB/octave roll-off), digitized at 500 Hz/channel and 
stored for off-line averaging. Electrode impedances were kept below 
5 kΩ. The vertical and horizontal electrooculogram were also recorded 
for eye blink correction. Trials with a raw EEG signal outside the range of 
±75 μV in amplitude, with muscle or any other artifacts in the recording 
epoch were rejected. Any sequences of trials containing incorrect stimu-
lus classiﬁ  cations, false alarms, and omissions were also discarded from 
the ERP analyses in all 3 task conditions.
Behavioral analyses
At the beginning of the Switch task, subjects were instructed to begin 
with the correct sorting rule up to the onset of the ﬁ  rst black symbol in the 
trial sequence. These trials were eliminated from the analyses. Reaction 
times (RTs) were measured and analyzed from correct trial sequences 
only. Any trial sequences containing false alarms, omissions, or any other 
errors were discarded from the analysis of RTs, although error trials were 
retained to compute accuracy indexes. Only the ﬁ  rst 3 target responses 
following a black symbol were considered for analysis, since behavioral 
costs in intermittently-instructed paradigms typically reach an asymptote 
Table 2.  Mean stimulus probability, P(S), and a priori estimations of mutual information between contextual stimulus information (C|S) and   available 
S–R mappings, I(SR, C|S), for the 3 task-sets in depicted in Figure 1. Shannon’s (1948) joint entropy Hxy pij pij ij (,) ( ,) ( ,) , =−∑ log , 
 
and its related 
notion of mutual information were used to estimate information transmission between black symbols and S–R mappings (cf. “contextual control” in Koechlin 
et al., 2003).
  All tasks    Oddball and NoGo tasks  Switch tasks
Task events  Stimulus set  P(S ) 
Mutual information I (SR, C|S) Mutual  information  I (SR, C|S)
✚  s1 0.050  I (sr, c|s1) = 0.0  I (sr, c|s1) = 0.0
✖  s2 0.050  I (sr, c|s2) = 0.0  I (sr, c|s2) = 1.0
Table 1.  Mean stimulus probability, P(S), and a priori estimations of mutual information between stimuli and responses, I (S, R), for the 3 tasks 
in Figure 1. Shannon’s (1948) joint entropy Hxy pij pij ij (,) ( ,) ( ,) , =−∑ log , and its related notion of mutual information were used to estimate infor-
mation transmission between sets of stimuli and responses. Only perceptual ‘shape’ classiﬁ  cations are considered here as an example (also see the 
“Appendix” section).
  All tasks    Oddball task  NoGo and switch tasks
Task events  Stimulus set  P(S ) 
Mutual information I (S, R ) Mutual  information  I (S, R )
✚  s1 0.050  I (s1, r 0) = 0.86  I (s1, r 0) = 3.29
✖  s2 0.050  I (s2, r 0) = 0.86  I (s2, r 0) = 3.29
●  s3 0.225  I (s3, r 0) = 0.86  I (s3, r 1) = 1.16
●  s4 0.225  I (s4, r 0) = 0.86  I (s4, r 1) = 1.16
■  s5 0.225  I (s5, r 1) = 1.16  I (s5, r 2) = 1.16
■  s6 0.225  I (s6, r 1) = 1.16  I (s6, r 2) = 1.16Task switching and information theory
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in later trials (Monsell, 2003; Rushworth et al., 2002). Following previous 
studies, we deﬁ  ned ‘restart costs’ as the mean difference in RTs and 
errors between the 1st and 2nd target responses following any black sym-
bol. ‘Switch costs’ were deﬁ  ned as the mean difference in RTs and errors 
between the 1st target response following an ‘x’ cue and the 1st target 
response following a ‘+’ cue.
The percentage of correct target responses and mean RTs from cor-
rect target trials were subjected to a 3-way mixed ANOVA, with Black 
symbol (‘x’ vs. ‘+’) and Target trial (1st, 2nd, 3rd) as the within-subjects 
factors, and Task (Switch, NoGo, Oddball) as the between-subjects factor 
(see Figure 3).
ERP analyses
ERP waveforms were computed off-line using a linked-mastoid reference. 
ERPs in the Switch, NoGo, and Oddball tasks were time-locked to the 
onset of black symbols (‘x’ vs. ‘+’), as well as to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd targets 
following each black symbol. Epoch length was 650 ms including a 50 ms 
baseline. This short baseline was adopted to minimize the effects of pre-
baseline shifts in some conditions (Karayanidis et al., 2003). A minimum of 
40 clean EEG epochs contributed to individual cue-locked ERP waveforms 
(‘x’ mean = 47.9 epochs; ‘+’ mean = 48 epochs). A minimum of 65 clean 
EEG epochs contributed to individual target-locked ERP waveforms (‘x’ 
mean = 115.5; ‘+’ mean = 115.9, with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd target trials col-
lapsed). Mean P3 amplitudes were computed after visual inspection of 
the grand averages of cue-locked and target-locked ERP waveforms, and 
coincided with the peak latency of these P3 sub-components (Figure 4). 
For the cue-locked ERPs, the mean amplitude of the early aspect of the P3 
component was measured in a 50-ms window around its peak latency at 
Cz (325–375 ms post-cue onset). The mean amplitude of the late aspect 
of the P3 component was measured in a 50-ms window around its peak 
latency at Pz (400–450 ms post-cue onset). Mean target-locked P3 ampli-
tudes were measured in a 50-ms window around their peak latency at Pz 
(325–375 ms post-target onset; Figure 4).
Cue-locked P3 potentials were analyzed using a 3-way mixed 
ANOVA with Task (Switch, NoGo, Oddball) as the between-subject fac-
tor, and Black symbol (‘x’ vs. ‘+’), and Electrode site (Fz, Cz, Pz) as the 
within-subject factors. Target-locked P3 potentials were analyzed with 
a   similar statistical design (with the brain responses to 1st, 2nd and 
3rd   targets   collapsed). A mixed ANOVA was used to test differences in the 
scalp   distribution of early and late cue-locked P3 and target-locked P3 
activations (Figure 5). The within-subject factors in this ANOVA consid-
ered three P3 sub-components (early P3, late P3, target P3), 3 Electrodes 
(Fz, Cz, Pz), plus the between-subject factor Task (NoGo, Oddball and 
Switch tasks). Sequential trial effects were examined with a mixed 
ANOVA   performed on   consecutive 1st, 2nd and 3rd target trials following 
black symbols in the Switch and NoGo tasks with the between-subject 
factor Task (Switch vs. NoGo), and 3 within-subject factors: Black symbol 
(‘x’ vs. ‘+’), Target trial (1st, 2nd, 3rd), and Electrode (Fz, Cz, Pz).
Regression and correlation analyses
A series of linear regression analyses were conducted to explore the 
association between behavioral costs and transient P3-like activations. An 
index of behavioral restart costs was computed as the difference in RTs 
between 1st and 2nd target responses following all black symbols accord-
ing to the formula: 1/2 × [(1st target after ‘x’ + 1st target after ‘+’) − (2nd tar-
get after ‘x’ + 2nd target after ‘+’)]. A behavioral index of   speciﬁ  c switch 
costs was computed as the difference in RTs between the 1st target 
response following black symbols ‘x’ and ‘+’ in all task conditions. These 
regression analyses considered data from 1st and 2nd target trials after 
any black symbol, allegedly showing the largest behavioral costs and 
strongest associations with cue-locked and target-locked P3 activations. 
An association of restart and switch costs with these P3-like potentials 
would suggest a role of those brain responses in the generation of the 
corresponding behavioral costs. However, such an association would also 
be expected based on differences in effort or arousal during task per-
formance (Kahneman, 1973). In order to examine the null hypothesis that 
transient P3-like activations reﬂ  ect general effort or arousal rather than 
Figure 3.  Behavioral results. Mean reaction times (RTs) and SEM to visual 
targets as a function of their sequential position following black symbols in 
the 3 task conditions.
Figure 4.  Event-related potentials (ERPs) at 3 midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, 
Pz). (A) Grand cue-locked ERPs elicited by black symbols ‘x’ and ‘+’ in the 
Switch, NoGo, and Oddball conditions. (B) Grand target-locked ERPs to black 
symbols ‘x’ and ‘+’ in the Switch, NoGo, and Oddball task conditions (with 1st, 
2nd and 3rd targets trials collapsed). Gray bars show the latency windows 
for amplitude measurements of the early and late aspects of cue-locked P3 
activity, and for target-locked P3 activity.Barceló et al.
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speciﬁ  c task-switching mechanisms, mean RTs to the 1st target following 
a black symbol were also considered as a criterion in a third regres-
sion model. In testing each regression model (restart costs, switch costs, 
mean RTs), we searched for the best ﬁ  t both within each task condition, 
as well as among those tasks where such an association was observed 
or predicted (i.e., the null hypothesis of general arousal predicts a nega-
tive association between mean RTs and mean P3 amplitudes in all 3 task 
conditions). Mean cue-locked P3 and   target-locked P3 amplitudes meas-
ured at 3 midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz) were used as predictors. Finally, 
in order to explore our hypothesis that early and late cue-locked P3 acti-
vations reﬂ  ect an integrated system for updating task-set information, 
in sharp contrast to target-locked P3 activations (Barcelo et al., 2002), 
we carried out a series of bivariate Pearson product-moment correla-
tions between our 3 indexes of brain activation. Alternatively, if parietally 
distributed late cue-locked P3 amplitudes   compared to target-locked P3, 
then these 2 indexes should be more strongly correlated than the early 
and late aspects of cue-locked P3 (cf. Polich, 2007).
SPSS v14.0 statistical software was used, and a signiﬁ  cance level of 
p < 0.05 was adopted for all statistical analyses. The level of signiﬁ  cance 
was adjusted when necessary with a Greenhouse–Geyser (G–G) correc-
tion against violation of the assumption of homogeneity in the variance of 
the means. A Bonferroni-corrected signiﬁ  cance level of p < 0.05 was also 
adopted for all tests of simple effects involving multiple comparisons.
Information theoretical analyses
We adopted an information theoretical approach to task-switching, 
whereby we obtained a priori estimations of the mutual information 
between sensory stimuli and motor responses in our tasks in order to 
guide our interpretation of behavioral and ERP results (cf. Barcelo and 
Knight, 2007). In so doing, we followed original recommendations by 
Miller (1956) for estimating the amount of information transmitted 
between   contextually related stimuli and responses (or input-output 
correlations) along a putative hierarchy of cognitive control (Koechlin 
and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007). These information-theoretic analyses led us 
to deﬁ   ne the informational structure of our task conditions in terms 
of overall stimulus and response entropies, as well as in terms of the 
mutual information between contextually related targets, non-targets 
and motor responses in each of our 3 tasks (Miller, 1956). A summary 
of these information theoretical estimations is shown in Figure 2 and 
in Tables 1 and 2. A more detailed report of these estimations can be 
found in the Appendix Section (cf. Barcelo and Knight, 2007; Koechlin 
and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007).
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Accuracy. The 3 tasks were performed very efﬁ  ciently, as conﬁ  rmed by 
the analysis of correct responses. Subjects scored an average of 94.1% 
correct trials in the Switch task, 95.7% in the NoGo task, and 98.2% 
in the Oddball task. A main effect for Task (F(2,47) = 19.8, p < 0.0001), 
revealed a higher percentage of correct responses in the Oddball task 
compared to the other 2 tasks (p < 0.001), but no differences between 
the Switch and NoGo tasks. An interaction between Task, Black symbol, 
and Target trial (F(4,94) = 7.1, p < 0.0001) revealed larger error rates in 
the ﬁ  rst target responses following a ‘x’ switch cue as compared to a 
‘+’ repeat cue in the Switch task (4.2% vs. 3.5%, respectively, p < 0.04). 
Mean error rates did not differ between black symbols ‘x’ and ‘+’ in later 
trials, nor in the other 2 control conditions. The interaction Task by Target 
trial (F(2,47) = 18.4, p < 0.0001), revealed larger error rates in the ﬁ  rst 
than the second target responses following any black symbol in both the 
Switch and NoGo tasks (mean 1st vs. 2nd trial difference: 2.5% vs. 1.6%, 
respectively), but not in the Oddball task.
Reaction times (RTs). The analysis of RTs yielded signiﬁ   cant main 
effects for all 3 factors: Task (F(2,47) = 9.4,  p < 0.0001),  Black  sym-
bol (F(1,47) = 7.9, p < 0.007) and Target trial (F(2,94) = 86.6, p < 0.0001, 
G–G = 0.67;  see  Figure 3). An interaction between Task and Target 
trial (F(4,94) = 21.6,  p < 0.0001,  G–G =  0.67) revealed the presence of 
restart costs in the Switch and NoGo tasks, but not in the Oddball task. 
In both the Switch and NoGo tasks, subjects responded slower to the 1st 
than 2nd or 3rd target trials (Ps < 0.0001 for all contrasts), with no dif-
ferences between 2nd and 3rd target trials. An interaction between Task 
and Black symbol (F(2,47) = 13.1,  p < 0.0001) revealed reliable switch 
costs in the Switch task in response to targets following ‘x’ switch vs. 
‘+’ repeat cues (p < 0.0001), but not in the NoGo (p = 0.6) nor Oddball 
tasks (p = 0.2). A 3-way interaction between Task, Black symbol, and 
Target trial (F(4,94) = 4.4, p < 0.003, G–G = 0.95), revealed a multiplicative 
association between restart and switch costs, as well as the presence of 
mixing costs in the Switch task (Monsell, 2003), but not in the 2 control 
tasks. The multiplicative association between restart and switch costs in 
the Switch task could be inferred from the larger switch costs to the 1st 
than to the 2nd targets (mean switch cost to 1st vs. 2nd target   trials = 49.5 
vs. 17.0 ms, p < 0.008). Mixing costs were inferred from the larger mean 
RTs to 3rd target trials in the Switch task as compared to the control tasks 
(Ps < 0.04; Figure 3).
ERP results
Cue-locked P3 (early aspect, early P3). A main effect of Task 
(F(2,45) = 11.9, p < 0.0001) revealed larger amplitudes of early P3 activity in 
the Switch and NoGo tasks as compared to the Oddball task (Ps < 0.001), 
with no signiﬁ  cant differences in early P3 amplitudes between Switch and 
NoGo tasks. Neither the Black symbol factor (F(1,45) < 1), nor its interaction 
with other factors modulated early P3 activity (see Figure 4A). An inter-
action between Task and Electrode (F(4,90) = 8.6, p < 0.0001, G–G = 0.77) 
revealed different scalp distributions of early P3 activity for different tasks. 
Early P3 amplitudes showed a maximum at the vertex (Cz) in all 3 task 
Figure 5.  Summary of grand mean amplitudes from 3 midline electrodes 
(Fz, Cz, Pz) of early and late cue-locked P3 and target-locked P3 acti-
vations in the 3 task conditions: Switch (comparing ‘x’ switch and ‘+’ 
repeat trials), NoGo and Oddball tasks (with ‘x’ and ‘+’ trials collapsed). 
Note the distinct scalp distribution of cue-locked P3 – but not of target-locked 
P3 – activity across the 3 task conditions.Task switching and information theory
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conditions (Figures 4 and 5). However, the comparatively reduced early 
P3 amplitudes over parietal regions in the Oddball task (Ps < 0.0001), 
were responsible for a relatively fronto-central scalp distribution of early 
P3 amplitudes in this task as compared with their more central-parietal 
scalp distribution in the Switch and NoGo tasks (Figures 4A, 5, 7).
Cue-locked P3 (late aspect, late P3). The main effects for Task and 
Black symbol reached signiﬁ   cance (F(2,45) = 18.9,  p < 0.0001,  and 
F(1,45) = 8.6,  p <  0.005, respectively; see Figure 4A). An interaction 
between Task and Black symbol (F(2,45) =  4.7, p < 0.014) revealed larger 
late P3 amplitudes in response to switch as compared to repeat cues 
in the Switch task only (p < 0.0001). In turn, late P3 responses to ‘x’ 
and ‘+’ black symbols did not differ in amplitude in the NoGo (p = 0.8) 
nor the Oddball tasks (p = 0.5). The analysis of simple effects of the 
interaction Task by Electrode (F(4,90) = 10.9, p < 0.0001, G–G = 0.65), 
revealed that late P3 amplitudes peaked at   central-parietal sites in both 
the Switch and NoGo tasks, whereas no such differences were apparent 
across midline electrodes in the Oddball task (Ps > 0.5). The interaction 
between Task, Black symbol and Electrode did not reach signiﬁ  cance 
(Figures 4A, 5 and 7).
Target-locked P3. A main effect for Electrode revealed signiﬁ  cant dif-
ferences in target-locked P3 activity across the 3 midline electrodes 
(F(2,90) = 65.6, p < 0.0001, G–G = 0.79), with maximal target P3 ampli-
tudes recorded at Pz (Ps < 0.005, for all pairwise contrasts among elec-
trodes; see Figures 4B, 5 and 7). The association between   behavioral 
restart costs and the modulations of target-locked P3 activity over 
  successive Target trials was further explored with a mixed ANOVA with 
the group factor Task (Switch, NoGo), and within-subjects factors Black 
symbol (‘x’ vs. ‘+’), Target trial (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and Electrode (Fz, Cz, Pz). Main 
effects for Target trial (F(2,60) = 6.4, p < 0.003, G–G = 0.89) and Electrode 
(F(2,60) = 35.7,  p < 0.0001,  G–G =  0.72), as well as the   interaction 
Target trial by Electrode (F(4,120) = 4.3, p < 0.016, G–G = 0.53), revealed 
an increase in target-locked P3 amplitude from 1st to 2nd target trials 
(p < 0.0001 at Cz; Figures 6 and 7). There was no difference in target-
locked P3 amplitudes between 2nd and 3rd target trials after a black sym-
bol. No other main effect or interactions reached signiﬁ  cance (Figures 6 
and 7). The Oddball task was not considered in this analysis because it 
did not show restart costs nor sequential target P3 effects.
Functional segregation of P3-like brain activations. The 3-way 
interaction between P3 sub-components (early P3, late P3, target P3), 
Task (Switch, NoGo, Oddball), and Electrode (Fz, Cz, Pz), was signiﬁ  cant 
(F(6,130) = 9.3, p < 0.0001, G–G = 0.72), suggesting that these P3 sub-
components were differently inﬂ  uenced by task conditions and site of 
recording (Figure 5). Early cue-locked P3 amplitudes revealed main 
effects for Task (F(2,45) = 12.7; p < 0.0001), and Electrode (F(2,90) = 40.7, 
p < 0.0001, G–G = 0.75), as well as for their interaction (F(4,90) = 8.7, 
p <  0.0001), indicating differential early cue-locked P3 activations 
between the Oddball task and the other 2 tasks at all mid-line electrodes 
(Ps < 0.02), but no differences in the scalp distribution of early cue-locked 
P3 activations were found between the Switch and NoGo tasks (Ps > 0.4; 
Figures 4A and 5). Late cue-locked P3 amplitudes showed main effects 
for Task (F(2,45) = 21.3, p < 0.0001), Electrode (F(2,90) = 53.4, p < 0.0001, 
G–G = 0.65), and their interaction (F(4,90) = 11.9, p < 0.0001), suggest-
ing a different distribution of neural generators across task conditions. 
Late cue-locked P3 amplitudes were larger in the NoGo task as com-
pared to the Oddball task at all midline sites (Ps < 0.0001; Figures 4A 
and 5), but differences between Switch and NoGo tasks were apparent 
at the mid-parietal region only (p < 0.02; with 10.9 μV and 6.9 μV in 
the Switch and NoGo tasks, respectively). In contrast, target-locked P3 
amplitudes showed a main effect for Electrode (F(2,90) = 67.7, p < 0.0001, 
G–G =  0.82), but not for Task nor any interaction with the other factors, 
  suggesting similar scalp distributions of target-locked P3 activity for all 
3 task conditions (Figures 4B and 5).
Figure  6. Target-locked ERPs to 3 consecutive targets trials in the 
Switch and NoGo tasks. Grand ERP waveforms elicited by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
targets in a sequence of trials (with ‘x’ and ‘+’ trials collapsed). The data are 
shown from 3 midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz). Gray bars indicate the latency 
window for measurement of mean target-locked P3 amplitudes.
Figure  7. Scalp topography of cue-locked P3 and target-locked P3 
amplitudes in the Switch (upper 2 rows) and NoGo tasks (lower row, 
with ‘x’ and ‘+’ trials collapsed). The topographic maps for cue-locked 
P3 activity were computed from the mean voltages of early P3 (325–375 ms) 
and late P3 (400–450 ms), respectively. Topographic maps for target P3 activ-
ity (325–375 ms) are displayed for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd target trials following 
a black symbol.
Association of behavioral costs with transient P3-like activations
A series of multiple regression analyses examined how much of the 
variance in behavioral costs and mean RTs was explained by cue-locked 
P3 and target-locked P3 activations. To minimize the number of predictor 
variables, we used the mean amplitude of early and late cue-locked P3 and Barceló et al.
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target-locked P3 measured at the mid-central electrode (Cz), since these 
provided the best ﬁ  ts with behavior and were strongly correlated with brain 
activity from other midline sites. For each of the 3 regression models, the 
dependent variable was 1 of the 3 behavioral indicators described in the 
“Materials and methods” section (restart costs, switch costs, mean RTs). 
In a ﬁ  rst stage, we adopted a stepwise regression procedure whereby 
predictors successively entered the model on the basis of the strength 
of their association with the dependent variable, after being covaried for 
the effects of variables already in the model. At a second stage, a forced-
entry procedure was adopted to evaluate the strength of the association 
of predictors with behavior after partialling out any   co-linearities. Model 
estimation ended when no other variable met a ﬁ  xed criterion for entry 
(p = 0.10). In testing each regression model, we searched for the best ﬁ  t 
both within each task condition, as well as across those tasks where an 
association had been observed or predicted (i.e., model 2 was tested in the 
Switch and NoGo tasks where restart costs had been observed). Table 3 
presents a summary of these regression analyses. Table 4 presents a 
summary of product–moment correlations between the predictors in our 
3 models, suggesting that the correlations between predictors strongly 
depended on task condition.
Switch-speciﬁ  c behavioral costs were signiﬁ  cantly associated with 
mean late cue-locked P3 ‘switch costs’ computed as the difference in 
Table 4.  Pearson product-moment correlations between mean P300 amplitudes measured at Cz.
  Cue-locked early P3  Cue-locked late P3  1st target P3  3rd target P3
Switch task (N = 17)
Cue-locked early P3  1.00  0.75** 0.66** 0.79**
Cue-locked late P3  -  1.00  0.54* 0.76**
1st target P3  -  -  1.00  0.73**
NoGo task (N = 16)
Cue-locked early P3  1.00  0.51* 0.76** 0.86**
Cue-locked late P3  -  1.00  0.59* 0.78**
1st target P3  -  -  1.00  0.82**
Oddball task (N = 17)
Cue-locked early P3  1.00  0.54* 0.51** 0.35  ns
Cue-locked late P3  -  1.00  –0.07 ns  –0.25 ns
1st target P3  -  -  1.00  0.62**
Across all tasks (N = 50)
Cue-locked early P3  1.00  0.76** 0.44** 0.67**
Cue-locked late P3  -  1.00  0.21 ns  0.52**
1st target P3  -  -  1.00  0.68**
*P < 0.05.
**P < 0.01 (2-tailed).
Table 3.  Summary of multiple linear regression analyses. The best ﬁ  ts were obtained for data from the Switch (models 1 and 2) and Nogo tasks 
(model 2). None of the 3 models ﬁ  tted data from the Oddball task.
Regression models and predictors  Overall R 2 (adjusted R 2), F statistic, degrees of freedom 
  (regression, residual), and partial standardized beta (β)
 Best  ﬁ  t, single task  Best ﬁ  t, across tasks
Model 1: Switch costs  R2 = 0.52 (0.41), F3, 13 = 4.7* -
Cue-locked early P3†  β = –0.26 ns  -
Cue-locked late P3†  β = –0.39* ns  -
1st target P3†  β = –0.67** ns  -
Model 2: Restart costs  R2 = 0.68 (0.60), F3, 12 = 8.4** R 2 = 0.27 (0.19), F3, 29 = 3.5*
Cue-locked early P3  β = 1.10**  β = 0.46*
Cue-locked late P3  β = 0.02 ns  β = 0.10 ns
1st target P3  β = –0.44 ns  β = –0.69 ns
Model 3: Mean RTs  R2 = 0.58 (0.48), F3, 13 = 5.9* R 2 = 0.37 (0.31), F3, 29 = 5.8***
Cue-locked early P3  β = –0.17 ns  β = 0.30 ns
Cue-locked late P3  β = 0.04 ns  β = 0.02 ns
1st target P3  β = –0.67**  β = –0.77***
(ns, non signiﬁ  cant).
*P < 0.05.
**P < 0.01.
***P < 0.001.
†Switch minus repeat trial differences in P3 amplitude were used instead of mean P3 amplitudes.Task switching and information theory
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amplitude of late P3 to switch vs. repeat symbols in the Switch task 
(Table 3, model 1). However, the strongest predictor of speciﬁ  c switch 
costs was mean target P3 amplitude, that raised the explained variance 
from 15 to 52% compared to the previous predictor. In both cases, larger 
‘switch minus repeat’ differences in late cue-locked P3 and target P3 
activations predicted smaller switch costs. Model 1 did not ﬁ  t data from 
the NoGo and Oddball tasks (Table 3).
Behavioral restart costs were explained by the mean amplitude 
of early cue-locked P3 activity in the NoGo and Switch task condi-
tions (Table 3, model 2). Mean early cue-locked P3 amplitudes in the 
NoGo task provided the best ﬁ  t to model 2, with 60% of explained vari-
ance in restart costs, with larger early P3 amplitudes predicting larger 
restart costs. Inclusion of the other 2 predictors yielded a non-signiﬁ  -
cant 7.8% increase of explained variance in the model, suggesting that 
their   contribution to restart costs was negligible after partialling out their 
  correlation with early P3 activity. The strength of this association was 
further reduced (to only 27% of explained variance) when data from the 
Switch task entered the model, suggesting that restart costs in the more 
complex Switch task were tapping into distinct sources of variability as 
those in the NoGo task.
Model 3 considered mean RTs to the 1st target trial as the criterion, 
since these were highly correlated with overall RTs (r = 0.96, p < 0.01 for 
the whole sample of N = 50). The best single task ﬁ  t for mean RTs was 
contributed by mean target P3 amplitudes to the 1st target in the Switch 
task (with 58% of explained variance), and this did not improve signiﬁ  -
cantly when considering subjects from the other 2 task conditions. In 
particular, none of the 3 regression models reached signiﬁ  cance for data 
from the Oddball task, suggesting a weak association between transient 
P3-like activations and behavior in this task condition.
Target-locked P3 activity always showed an inverse relationship with 
all behavioral indexes, while also being directly associated with early and 
late cue-locked P3 amplitudes. The relative strength of the association 
between all 3 brain indexes did not depend on the temporal proximity 
between the measures, as suggested by the stronger correlations between 
1st and 3rd target P3 activations, as compared with early and late cue-
locked P3 activations (e.g., NoGo and Oddball tasks, Table 4). These rela-
tively strong correlations among all 3 brain indexes need to be taken into 
consideration when interpreting results from the regression analyses.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In accord with the extant literature on task-switching, we observed behav-
ioral costs consisting of slower and less accurate target responses when 
participants intermittently switched their classiﬁ  cation rule. Importantly, 
we found response costs in speed and accuracy in the context of task 
repetitions as well as of task switches. A comparison with 2 perceptu-
ally identical control tasks conveying equivalent amounts of stimulus 
entropy, but involving different response demands (Figures 1 and 2, and 
Tables 1 and 2), allowed us to fractionate the overall behavioral costs 
into 2 distinct portions that were also related to distinct transient P3-like 
activations. First, large switch-unspeciﬁ  c restart costs were measured 
to the 1st target responses following all black symbols in the Switch and 
NoGo tasks, and regardless of the explicit meaning of those signals for 
updating the currently active S–R mappings. Second, a smaller switch-
speciﬁ  c switch cost was related to the meaning of ‘x’ switch symbols in 
the Switch task for updating the currently active S–R mapping in work-
ing memory. Behavioral restart and switch costs were accompanied 
by enhanced early and late cue-locked P3 activations, respectively. In 
contrast, target-locked P3 amplitudes were signiﬁ  cantly reduced to the 
1st target following all black symbols in the Switch and NoGo tasks, but 
did not differ between tasks in the 2nd and later repetition trials. These 
ﬁ   ndings support a critical functional dissociation between the neural 
underpinnings of parietally distributed late cue-locked P3 and target 
P3 activations (Barcelo et al., 2002, 2006). These transient P3-like acti-
vations did not capture an important portion of behavioral mixing costs 
in the Switch task. Next we discuss these data in the light of the recent 
task-switching literature.
Restart costs and ‘early’ cue-locked P3 activity
In accord with previous task-switching studies (Altmann, 2002; 
Rushworth et al., 2002; Schneider and Logan, 2006), the comparison of 
our Switch task with 2 perceptually identical control tasks indicated that 
a large portion of the overall behavioral costs consisted of switch-unspe-
ciﬁ  c restart costs at the beginning of each trial sequence. Behavioral 
restart costs were observed only in those 2 task conditions with the larg-
est amount of task-set information (with 6:3 S–R mappings each), and 
affected only the 1st target response following the appraisal of contextual 
signals conveying a large amount of information for response selection 
(see Table 1 and Figure 2). According to our estimations, the information 
conveyed by black symbols in the Switch and NoGo tasks exceeded the 
theoretical limit for holding information in human working memory (see 
Figure 2; cf. Miller, 1956). Tasks showing behavioral restart costs also 
showed enhanced   cue-locked P3 activations (Figures 3 and 4A). Neither 
restart costs nor cue-locked P3 activations were observed in response 
to the least informative black symbols in the Oddball task. These effects 
cannot be attributed to purely sensory processes, since black symbols 
were embedded in identical stimulus contexts in the 3 task conditions. 
Instead, these results suggest that restart costs, and the accompanying 
cue-locked P3 activations, were a function of response uncertainty (cf. 
Sutton et al., 1965), as formally estimated through the mutual information 
between the eliciting stimulus and the available responses within each 
task context (Barcelo and Knight, 2007; Barcelo et al., 2006; Koechlin 
et al., 2003).
Behavioral task-switching costs have been attributed to switch-
unspeciﬁ   c cue-related sensory priming and task-set encoding or 
retrieval (Logan and Bundesen, 2003; Schneider and Logan, 2005). In 
line with these proposals, restart costs in the Switch and NoGo tasks, 
together with the accompanying early cue-locked P3 activations, were 
related to the   initiation of trial sequences (or ‘block transitions’; cf. Fox 
et al., 2005), rather than to any switch-speciﬁ  c mechanism. However, 
the sensory priming hypothesis cannot explain the absence of restart 
costs and cue-locked P3 activations in the Oddball task, with equiva-
lent sensory priming or cue encoding demands as the other 2 tasks 
(Logan and Schneider, 2006). The hypothetical effects of cue-repetition 
beneﬁ  ts could be discarded after equating the proportion of cue repeti-
tions and cue switches (Logan and Bundesen, 2003), and because our 
transition cues provided a control for the potential confound between 
task-  switching and cue-switching (Forstmann et al., 2007). Even if the 
encoding and/or retrieval of semantic or episodic memories could be 
held responsible for the restart costs and brain activations in the Switch 
task, this would not apply to the NoGo task, where black symbols did not 
demand any explicit memory operations (Logan et al., 2007). Therefore, 
the present results argue against an account of behavioral restart costs, 
and the accompanying cue-locked P3 activations, in terms of processing 
(either priming, encoding, retrieval or updating) of purely perceptual rep-
resentations of visual   information. Instead, these results are consistent 
with the existence of general-  purpose, lower-level preparatory task acti-
vation processes shared by the Switch and NoGo tasks (Allport and Wylie, 
2000; Altmann, 2002; Jennings and van der Molen, 2005; Schneider and 
Logan, 2006).
The observed pattern of behavioral restart costs, and the accompa-
nying cue-locked P3 activations, are not consistent with the updating of 
purely motor representations either, because black symbols were  explicitly 
associated to a ‘no response’ motor program in all 3 task conditions, and 
they did not demand any differential processing in our NoGo and Oddball 
tasks. However, the differential sequencing of motor responses in the 
3 tasks determined the differential informational value of black symbols, 
and therefore, this factor remains the main candidate for accounting for 
the observed behavioral and brain modulations. It could be argued that 
the black symbols invested a hierarchical structure to trial sequences Barceló et al.
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in the Switch and NoGo tasks, whereby response execution to every 
task stimulus was unpredictably interrupted by an infrequent symbol. In 
contrast, the same association of black symbols with a ‘no response’ 
did not induce such a control structure in the Oddball task, where motor 
responses were more sparsely and irregularly distributed over time. 
Accordingly, the grouping of motor responses into regular sequences of 
target trials could be regarded as equivalent to the spatial and tempo-
ral grouping of task stimuli for inducing hierarchical control structures 
(Lien and Ruthruff, 2004; Schneider and Logan, 2006). Our information 
theoretical estimations indicated that black symbols afforded highly 
informative boundaries for separating sequentially ordered groupings of 
target responses in the Switch and NoGo – but not the Oddball – tasks. 
The topographical distribution of cue-locked P3 activations over fronto-
 parietal scalp regions overlaying pre- and post-rolandic multimodal asso-
ciation cortices are also consistent with a sensorimotor – rather than a 
purely sensory or a purely motor – nature of the neural representations 
being updated in response to the black symbols. This hypothesis agrees 
with proposals that the preparatory control of action involves activation 
of cognitive representations rather than sensory or motor representations 
(Jennings and van der Molen, 2005). This interpretation also agrees with 
previous accounts of behavioral costs, and cue-locked P3 activations, as 
inﬂ  uenced by hierarchical structure, motor planning, and response strat-
egies (Donchin, 1981; Lien and Ruthruff, 2004; Schneider and Logan, 
2006). From this perspective, behavioral restart costs, and the accom-
panying cue-locked P3 activations, could be interpreted as reﬂ  ecting 
general purpose cortical-subcortical dynamics during the intermittent re-
activation of task-set information for the preparatory regulation of action 
(Jennings and van der Molen, 2005; Norman and Shallice, 1986; O’Reilly 
and Frank, 2006).
The unpredictable onset of black symbols arguably re-activated task-
set representations (Figure 1), but only when those symbols provided 
informative boundaries for the preparatory regulation of action. This was 
a general and switch-unspeciﬁ  c mechanism, independent of whether 
the ongoing task goal was to maintain or to reconﬁ  gure the currently 
active S–R mapping. The direct association between restart costs and 
early cue-locked P3 amplitudes concurs with previous accounts of tran-
sient ‘nogo P3’ activity in terms of inhibitory action control (Pfefferbaum 
et al., 1985), in anticipation of upcoming task demands (Jennings and 
van der Molen, 2005; Norman and Shallice, 1986). From this perspec-
tive restart costs, and the accompanying cue-locked P3, could both 
reﬂ  ect the mobilization of neural resources in the face of larger response 
demands in the Switch and NoGo tasks. The hypothesis of a common 
pool of attentional resources would be consistent with the strong cor-
relations between cue- and target-locked P3 activations during task 
preparation and execution (Kahneman, 1973). However, such a common 
pool of resources would also leave unexplained a large proportion of 
variance in the data. The rather low correlations between P3-like activity 
and behavior in the most difﬁ  cult (Switch) and easiest (Oddball) tasks 
point to a complex, possibly non-linear contribution from multiple com-
ponent processes to the anticipatory preparation of action (Jennings and 
van der Molen, 2005).
Finally, transient P3-like activations failed to capture an important 
portion of switch-unspeciﬁ  c mixing costs in the Switch task (Monsell, 
2003). Residual mixing costs were observed in target trials following 
both switch and repeat cues in the Switch condition only, and were 
mostly apparent during the third target in a trial sequence, after restart 
and switch costs had subsided. Mixing costs could reﬂ  ect passive task-
set inertia (Allport and Wylie, 2000), but also maintenance of alternative 
S–R mappings necessary for an imminent S–R reversal (Braver et al., 
2003; Meiran, 1996). Mixing costs were captured neither by cue-locked 
P3 activity, nor by target P3 that showed similar amplitudes to the 3rd 
  target in all 3 task conditions. One likely candidate for indexing mixing 
costs was a sustained fronto-parietal negativity observed towards the 
end of the cue-to-target interval in the Switch task (not shown). Whereas 
mean ERP amplitudes in the NoGo and Oddball tasks returned to a zero 
baseline from 800 to 1500 ms post-cue onset, grand ERP waveforms in 
the Switch task remained below −4 μV at the onset of the 1st target in 
the sequence (not shown). These sustained negativities were not part of 
our original hypotheses and will not be further discussed here. Similar 
sustained negativities overlaying frontal and parietal scalp regions during 
the cue-to-target interval have been reported in previous task-switching 
studies (Barcelo et al., 2006; Kieffaber and Hetrick, 2005; Nicholson et al., 
2005), and their likely association with residual mixing costs deserves 
further examination in future studies.
Switch costs and ‘late’ cue-locked P3 activity
The brain responses to ‘x’ switch and ‘+’ repeat symbols in the Switch task 
revealed a switch-speciﬁ  c enhancement of the late aspect of cue-locked 
P3 activity, consistent with ﬁ  ndings from other laboratories (Kieffaber 
and Hetrick, 2005; Nicholson et al., 2005; Rushworth et al., 2002), and in 
agreement with our hypothesis of an association between speciﬁ  c switch 
costs and late cue-locked P3 activations (Barcelo et al., 2002, 2006). 
Information theoretical estimations indicated that ‘x’ switch symbols in 
the Switch task conveyed 1 more bit of information for response selection 
than ‘+’ repeat symbols, as only the former prompted for the selection of 
1 S–R mapping out of 2 possible options (Table 2). As expected, no such 
behavioral nor physiological modulations were observed in the NoGo and 
Oddball tasks, as these did not convey any extra contextual information 
for response selection (i.e., they did not prompt for any task-set switching 
operation). The present association of speciﬁ  c switch costs with parietally 
distributed late cue-locked P3 modulations also concurs with proposals 
about the role of parietal association cortices in the reconﬁ  guration of 
S–R mappings in memory (Rushworth and Taylor, 2006).
The comparison of early and late cue-locked P3 activations in the 
Switch and NoGo tasks suggests that in order to reconﬁ  gure an old S–R 
mapping, it may be necessary to re-activate ﬁ  rst the currently active 
task-set (cf. Altmann, 2002). Although somewhat counterintuitive, the 
re-activation of an already active task-set may reﬂ  ect a default mode 
of cortical-subcortical dynamics during task-set shifting operations 
(O’Reilly, 2006; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006; Robbins, 2007). Active main-
tenance of familiar and over-learned task information is thought to be 
partly managed subcortically, and with limited involvement from higher-
ordered cortical control (Malmo, 1942). In turn, the updating of task-set 
information in response to novel and highly informative environmental 
events has been shown to demand prefrontal control (Barcelo and Knight, 
2007; Knight, 1984). Accordingly, the default mode of cortical-subcortical 
dynamics when a highly informative signal interrupts us while perform-
ing a familiar, well-rehearsed and automated task may involve uploading 
the ongoing task-set from subcortical to cortical memory networks in 
preparation for any potential cortical updating or re-adjustments (O’Reilly, 
2006; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). This proposal would explain the simi-
lar modulations of early cue-locked P3 activity in our NoGo and Switch 
tasks (indexing reactivation of similar task-set information), whereas late 
P3 modulations (indexing updating of S–R mappings) were only observed 
in the Switch task. This account would also explain why the late aspect of 
cue-locked P3 activity is always subordinated to its early aspect (Barcelo 
et al., 2002, 2006). Finally, this hypothesis is also consistent with the 
stronger correlations found between early and late cue-locked P3 ampli-
tudes, rather than between late cue-locked P3 and target P3 amplitudes 
(see Table 4; cf. Polich, 2007).
The observed pattern of switch-speciﬁ  c switch costs cannot be eas-
ily reconciled with alternative explanations in terms of stimulus prim-
ing, or as an encoding advantage of cue repetitions over cue switches 
(Logan and Bundesen, 2003). The hypothesis of task-set inertia would 
be more consistent with sustained brain activations rather than with the 
observed transient modulation in late – but not early – cue-locked P3 
(Allport and Wylie, 2000; Altmann, 2002). Moreover, if the enhanced late 
cue-locked P3 indexed passive interference from the old S–R mapping, 
we would expect a direct association with behavioral switch costs. On 
the contrary, our regression analyses replicated previous ﬁ  ndings of an Task switching and information theory
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inverse association, with larger late cue-locked P3 predicting smaller 
switch-speciﬁ  c behavioral costs (cf. Barcelo et al., 2006). The present 
evidence suggests that switch-speciﬁ  c costs, and the accompanying late 
cue-locked P3 activations, reﬂ  ect the updating of S–R mappings from 
the active task set in preparation for the next trial sequence (Barcelo 
et al., 2002; Rushworth et al., 2002). These switch speciﬁ  c cue-locked 
P3 modulations meet the 2 criteria established by Meiran (1996) to dis-
tinguish task-preparation from task-execution processes, namely (1) late 
cue-locked P3 activations were speciﬁ  c to switch cues in the Switch task, 
and (2) they occurred in advance of response execution.
In accord with previous claims that switch-speciﬁ  c costs are ‘van-
ishingly small’ (Logan et al., 2007), we found rather moderate switch 
costs compared with the portion of switch-unspeciﬁ  c (both restart and 
mixing) costs in the Switch task. However, our information theoretical 
analyses suggested that switch cues conveyed only a limited amount 
of contextual information (1 bit) for updating S–R mappings in working 
memory,   compared with the total amount of information conveyed by the 
same cues for response selection (Figure 2, Table 1). One corollary from 
these analyses is that larger amounts of contextual uncertainty for updat-
ing the active S–R mappings – relative to the total amount of task-set 
  information – may result in larger switch-speciﬁ  c costs and larger late 
cue-locked P3 amplitudes (Barcelo et al., 2006).
Finally, we found evidence of an interaction between restart and 
switch costs in the Switch task, where switch-speciﬁ  c costs were sig-
niﬁ  cantly larger in the 1st compared to the 2nd target trials (Figure 3). One 
interpretation of this interaction is that the neural substrates of switch 
and restart costs draw from a common pool of subcortical resources 
(e.g., common neuromodulatory systems in the brainstem; Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2005; Pfaff, 2006; Soltani and Knight, 2000), even though they 
each could be ultimately contributed by different cortical mechanisms. 
Another possibility is that switch costs relate to higher-level cortical S–R 
reconﬁ  guration, but this depends on a general-purpose arousal mecha-
nism for re-activating task information (Robbins, 2007). Yet another com-
patible possibility is that the highly informative ‘x’ switch cues (Figure 2) 
momentarily overloaded memory capacity, carrying over any cortical S–R 
reconﬁ  guration to the 2nd target trial. Whatever the cause for this interac-
tion, the classic hypothesis of a common pool of attentional resources 
(Kahneman, 1973) cannot easily account for the 3 types of behavioral 
costs (switch, restart, mixing), and the dissociation between early and 
late cue-locked P3 and target P3 activations disclosed here (Jennings 
and van der Molen, 2005).
Task-set implementation and target P3 activity
Target-locked P3 activations suggested that behavioral task-switching 
costs reﬂ  ect a combination of different neural mechanisms encompassing 
both the preparation and execution stages of task performance (Jennings 
and van der Molen, 2005; Rubinstein et al., 2001). The pattern of target 
P3 activations during task-set implementation – and their association 
with behavior – differed markedly from cue-locked P3 activations during 
the preparatory period (cf. Barcelo et al., 2002). This double dissociation 
was reﬂ  ected in the distinct scalp distribution of peak P3-like amplitudes 
across the 3 task conditions (Figures 6 and 7). The analysis of sequential 
target effects in the Switch and NoGo tasks revealed reduced target P3 
amplitudes to 1st target trials following a black symbol, with no further 
changes between 2nd and 3rd targets trials. In accord with previous stud-
ies, these effects occurred regardless of the meaning of switch vs. repeat 
cues for updating the current S–R mappings (Barcelo et al., 2000, 2002; 
Kieffaber and Hetrick, 2005; Nicholson et al., 2005). These target P3 
modulations suggested that switch-unspeciﬁ  c mechanisms responsible 
for restart costs also extended their inﬂ  uence to the execution stage of 
task performance. Thus, reduced 1st target P3 amplitudes in the Switch 
and NoGo tasks seemed to reﬂ  ect momentary lesser control (due to 
residual uncertainty) following the onset of highly informative signals that 
overloaded working memory capacity (Figure 2). Except for this momen-
tary reduction in 1st target P3 amplitudes in the 2 most difﬁ  cult tasks, 
mean target P3 amplitudes did not differ between the 3 task conditions. 
In agreement with our estimations of the mutual information of targets 
for response selection, target-locked P3 activations also suggested that 
similar attentional resources were allocated to the processing of visual 
targets in all 3 task conditions (Figures 2 and 4).
The negative correlations found between target P3 amplitudes and 
all behavioral indexes (restart costs, switch costs and mean RTs), indi-
cated that larger target P3 amplitudes indexed a more efﬁ  cient and faster 
implementation of task-set information (the task rules). This associa-
tion is consistent with previous task-switching studies where a gradual 
improvement in behavioral efﬁ  ciency was accompanied by a gradual 
increase in target P3 amplitude along successive repetition trials (Barcelo 
et al., 2000, 2002; Kieffaber and Hetrick, 2005; Nicholson et al., 2005; 
Rushworth et al., 2002). These results suggest that target P3 activity 
reﬂ  ects the exploitative implementation of task-set information, as func-
tionally and anatomically distinct to the resolution of response uncertainty 
indexed by cue-locked P3 activations (Barcelo and Knight, 2007; Barcelo 
et al., 2006). These two functionally distinct P3-like components can be 
easily mistaken in selective attention and oddball tasks, where the brain 
activations recorded to improbable targets reﬂ  ect a mixture of explora-
tory (uncertainty resolution) and exploitative (task execution) processes 
(Donchin, 1981; Karayanidis et al., 2003). Undoing this potential con-
found will help clarify a long-standing dispute about the functional role 
of brain P3-like potentials (Falkenstein et al., 1994; Verleger, 1988), and 
seems a prerequisite for elucidating their distinct anatomy (Barcelo and 
Knight, 2007; Knight, 1984), neurochemistry (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005), 
and clinical applications (Polich, 2007).
Mutual S–R information and the preparatory control of action
The present results agree with the extant literature about the existence 
of both switch-speciﬁ  c and switch-unspeciﬁ  c processes that contribute 
to overall task-switching costs. Our information estimations revealed 
two sources of behavioral costs that corresponded with the allocation 
of attentional resources at two levels in a putative hierarchy of con-
trol: (1)  during the intermittent re-activation of task-set information, 
and (2) and during the updating of speciﬁ  c S–R mappings in working 
memory. These results lend partial support to both sides of the con-
troversy about the role of executive vs. non-executive control proc-
esses in task switching (Allport and Wylie, 2000; Logan and Bundesen, 
2003; Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 2003). More importantly, this information 
theoretic approach has heuristic value for making predictions about the 
presence or absence of behavioral costs across a wide variety of task 
situations based on the history of contextual contingencies between 
response demands and environmental events. In accordance with the 
hypothesis of selection-for-action (Allport, 1987; Norman and Shallice, 
1986), our information estimations suggest that the informational con-
tent of sensory signals depends on the history of responses associated 
with those signals, a notion best captured with the concept of mutual 
S–R information (Koechlin and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007). From this perspec-
tive, it is probably inaccurate to ascribe the present task-switch costs 
to either purely exogenous sensory processes (Logan and Bundesen, 
2003), nor to a purely endogenous act of executive control (Meiran, 
1996). Instead, the present results suggest that the informational con-
tent of environmental events depends on their contextual association 
with previous and anticipated response demands. For the same reason, 
the present behavioral and physiological results do not ﬁ  t well with clas-
sic dichotomous taxonomies of attended vs. ignored (Donchin, 1981), 
task-relevant vs. task-irrelevant (Näätänen, 1990; Posner and Petersen, 
1990), or voluntary vs. involuntary processing modes (Kahneman, 1973). 
These dualistic classiﬁ  cations of task events rely on intuitive notions of 
information processing, and do not consider the history of contextual 
S–R associations which confer exogenous signals with their infor-
mational value for goal-oriented behavior. The information conveyed 
by the cumulative history of S–R associations within a particular task 
  context, as formally described through information theoretical measures Barceló et al.
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(Koechlin and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007), could result in a more ﬂ  exible and 
accurate predictor of brain-behavior interactions.
We conﬁ  rmed and extended previous ERP ﬁ  ndings by demonstrating 
an association of behavioral restart and switch costs with the early and 
late aspects, respectively, of a cognitive ‘P300’ potential that has long 
been related to the resolution of uncertainty (Sutton et al., 1965). Sutton 
and collaborators (1965), and many authors thereafter (Donchin, 1981; 
Johnson, 1986), attributed the observed P300 modulations to the reso-
lution of stimulus uncertainty. However, those earlier observations can 
be also explained in terms of the subjects’ response uncertainty about 
incoming stimulation, based on the history of past S–R associations. The 
present cue-locked P3 activations, and the accompanying behavioral 
costs, seemed to be a function of the response uncertainty generated in 
3 identical stimulus contexts calling for different response demands, as 
estimated through the mutual information (also transmitted information; 
Miller, 1956; see Figure 2) between black symbols and their contextu-
ally associated response demands. In order to reach this conclusion, it 
was important to rely on quantitative – even if very simple –   estimations 
of mutual S–R information. These estimations were facilitated by the use 
of simpler sets of stimuli and responses than in our previous task-set 
switching studies. In turn, it would have been questionable to describe 
and explain the present behavioral and ERP results based just on our 
intuitive notion about the “effort”, “demands”, “difﬁ  culty” or “saliency” 
of task events. All these concepts can be subsumed within formal esti-
mations of mutual S–R information, which also offered us a deeper 
insight into the nature of information processing stages. For instance, 
our information estimations and target P3 potentials suggested that 
similar attentional resources were allocated to the processing of visual 
targets in all 3 task conditions (Figures 2 and 4). On the contrary, larger 
attention and “effort” were devoted to the appraisal of the highly inform-
ative black symbols (Kahneman, 1973). In spite of the intuitive associa-
tion of cognitive P300 potentials with information theoretical concepts 
ever since their discovery (Donchin, 1981; Johnson, 1986; Sutton et al., 
1965), most past ERP studies did not formally estimate the mutual infor-
mation between sensory, motor, and sensorimotor representations along 
a   putative hierarchy of cognitive control (cf. Barcelo and Knight, 2007). 
This new approach allowed us to disclose a critical dissociation between 
transient P3-like activations associated with the exploratory resolution 
of uncertainty during the preparatory control of action (i.e., cue-locked 
P3, P300, novelty P3), as distinct from the exploitative implementation 
of task-set information during task execution (target P3). These two 
functionally different P3-like components may overlap, and thus be 
easily mistaken, in the brain responses to improbable targets in odd-
ball tasks, which often reﬂ  ect a mixture of task preparation and task 
execution processes (Falkenstein et al., 1994; Nicholson et al., 2005; 
Polich, 2007; Verleger, 1988). Information theoretical estimations may 
contribute to undoing this potential confound in future ERP and brain 
imaging studies.
Here we utilized an information theoretical model adopted from brain 
imaging studies of prefrontal executive function in humans (Koechlin and 
Summerﬁ  eld, 2007). In spite of the limited spatial resolution of scalp-
recorded brain potentials, the modulations of the ‘frontal’ aspect of 
cue-locked P3 activations were compatible with the role of lateral pre-
frontal cortex in the elicitation of cognitive P300 potentials (Barcelo and 
Knight, 2007; Knight, 1984). The analyses of scalp topography shown 
in  Figure 5 suggested distinct distributions of neural sources across 
anterior and posterior cortical regions, supporting the functional segre-
gation of early and late cue-locked P3, as well as of target P3 activations. 
However, the strong correlations found among all these P3-like subcom-
ponents also lent support to the hypothesis that they may be modulated 
by common neuromodulatory systems in the brainstem (Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2005; Ranganath and Rainier, 2003; Soltani and Knight, 2000), 
even though they each be ultimately related to different cortical mecha-
nisms. The strongest correlations among transient P3-like activations 
were observed in the NoGo and Switch tasks, probably reﬂ  ecting a well 
  coordinated arousal response during the preparation and execution of 
the most complex tasks (Jennings and van der Molen, 2005; Pfaff, 2006). 
The double   dissociations found in behavioral costs and the accompa-
nying P300 modulations do not ﬁ  t well with a classic model of general 
arousal (Kahneman, 1973), nor with a unique neuromodulatory system 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Instead, these observations agree with the 
hypothesis that distinct lower- and higher-ordered control mechanisms 
depend on appropriate subcortical inputs from several neuromodulatory 
systems (Robbins, 2000, 2007). The functional segregation of distinct 
P3-like activations disclosed here may help deﬁ  ne the contribution from 
different neuromodulatory systems to distinct cognitive P3-like potentials 
related to task-set switching and implementation. Therefore, the pat-
tern of behavioral and brain responses disclosed here are probably best 
explained in terms of mutually informed cortical-subcortical dynamics 
during task preparation and execution (Barcelo and Knight, 2007; O’Reilly 
and Frank, 2006; Robbins, 2000).
Finally, our simple information estimations did not account for sev-
eral sources of variability in the data (i.e., residual mixing costs and 
sustained negativities towards the end of cue-to-target intervals in the 
Switch task). Further research will be necessary to clarify whether these 
sustained negativities, as well as transient target P3 activations, are also 
amenable to information theoretical analyses. Future studies should 
address whether the task preparation processes disclosed here reﬂ  ect 
re-  activation of an old task-set (Altmann, 2002), inhibition of a recently 
active task-set (Allport and Wylie, 2000), or competition between alterna-
tive processing pathways (Monsell, 2003). The functional and anatomical 
regularities of cognitive P300 potentials described in this and in previous 
task-  switching studies, over and above the different sensory modalities, 
response demands, stimulus materials and task procedures, all lend 
support to the idea that cue-locked P3 potentials reﬂ  ect fundamentally 
similar cognitive and neural mechanisms related to the resolution of 
response uncertainty (Barcelo and Knight, 2007; Barcelo et al., 2006), 
during task-set stopping and shifting (Robbins, 2007), and whose general 
principles could be eventually   furnished into a general theory for the pre-
paratory control of action (Jennings and van der Molen, 2005; Koechlin 
and Summerﬁ  eld, 2007; Norman and Shallice, 1986).
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Table A1.  Stimulus entropy HS ps ps i
i
ii () () l o g () 1
6
2 =− ⋅ =
= ∑ .
 All  tasks
Stimulus codes  H(s)  p(s) log2 P(s)
s1  0.22 0.05 –4.29
s2  0.22 0.05 –4.29
s3  0.48 0.22 –2.16
s4  0.48 0.22 –2.16
s5  0.48 0.22 –2.16
s6  0.48 0.22 –2.16
H(S) = 2.37Task switching and information theory
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